o we all have our images of Germany’s original push, the blitzkrieg, with well-run German tanks superior in technology and tactics to every nation they faced.

Right?

Well, as Matthew Cooper and James Lucas lay out in this 1976 book, no, not quite.

The two authors make a pretty good case, showing how the successful (yet too little, too late) infiltration tactics of World War One led to the ideal of total mechanized warfare. You punch through a weak point. You drive hard, cutting communications and command, and rout the enemy. It’s how cavalry used to be used.

And the Germans did pretty well in 1940’s France. Their tanks were (surprise) weaker and lighter-armored than their French and English counterparts. Yet still they punched through to glory.

Or did they? With the army groups demanding that the flanks be held and Hitler holding them back from Dunkirk, they really hamstrung their own armor. And as the authors point out in this interesting book, as they war went on (with army desiring armor to be “attached” to infantry formations in support, and Hitler fussing and micromanaging) it was all for naught. Time and time again, the Germans are able to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory, throwing away vast armor reserves at Stalingrad and Kursk, and stalling any armored resistance on D-day (Hitler slept in and the chance was lost). And Africa Korps – the mismanagement was enough to break your heart.

So yes, it’s fun to play “what if” with World War Two history, but it does seem that the German High Command was its own worst enemy, leaning valuable lessons in France and then forgetting them over the next four years.

Hitler only had himself to blame in his little Berlin Bunker.

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